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I. INTRODUCTION
The scope and enforcement of prosecutorial disclosure obligations have 
generated great controversy in the more than five decades since Justice Douglas 
wrote his seminal opinion in Brady vs. Maryland.1  These topics continue to 
generate controversy. Bennett Gershman is a prominent and articulate voice in 
a chorus of critics who complain both that the scope of required disclosure is 
unduly narrow and that there is inadequate adherence to and enforcement of the 
Brady disclosure obligation. A troubling number of high-profile cases, several 
of which Professor Gershman describes in his recent book, Prosecution Stories, 
have involved egregious disclosure violations.2 
A contentious area has been prosecutorial disclosure requirements in the 
context of negotiated guilty pleas.3 Should Brady disclosure be seen as a trial 
right that, like the right to a jury trial and the right to confront witnesses, is 
waived by entering a guilty plea? Or, like the right to counsel, should the right 
to Brady disclosure be retained by a defendant who pleads guilty? Should 
criminal procedure rules, such as Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure 16 and 
11, be amended to require disclosure in the guilty plea context? Should ethics 
rules be amended or interpreted to require such disclosure? 
In debates about disclosure, arguments grounded in fairness, efficiency, 
voluntariness, witness safety, psychology, accuracy and other concerns have 
been advanced. In this essay, I will not canvas those arguments. Nor will I survey 
the history of the Supreme Court’s development of the Brady doctrine or state 
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1 Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
2 See BENNETT GERSHMAN, PROSECUTION STORIES ch. 6 (2017).
3 Articles addressing disclosure in the guilty plea context include: R. Michael Cassidy, Plea
Bargaining, Discovery, and the Intractable Problem of Impeachment Disclosures, 66 VAND. L. REV. 
1427 (2011); John G. Douglass, Can Prosecutors Bluff? Brady v. Maryland and Plea Bargaining, 57 
CASE W.R.L. REV. 581 (2007); John G. Douglass, Fatal Attraction? The Uneasy Courtship of Brady 
and Plea Bargaining, 50 EMORY L.J. 437 (2001); Corinna Barret Lain, Accuracy Where It Matters: 
Brady v. Maryland in the Plea Bargaining Context, 80 WASH U.L.Q. 1 (2002); Kevin C. McMunigal, 
Disclosure and Accuracy in the Guilty Plea Process, 40 HASTINGS L.J. 957 (1989); Kevin C. 
McMunigal, Guilty Pleas, Brady Disclosure, and Wrongful Convictions, 57 CASE W.R.L. REV. 651 
(2007); Michael N. Petegorsky, Plea Bargaining in the Dark: The Duty to Disclose Exculpatory Brady 
Evidence During Plea Bargaining, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 3599 (2013). 
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legislative developments dealing with prosecutorial disclosure. Existing 
scholarship on guilty plea disclosure ably describes these. Instead, I focus on 
three facets of the guilty plea disclosure debate: (1) Does a negotiated guilty plea 
necessarily entail a bargain? (2) Is the accuracy of guilty pleas a genuine 
concern? (3) Should ethics authorities create prosecutorial rules more expansive 
than Brady? 
II. DOES A NEGOTIATED GUILTY PLEA NECESSARILY ENTAIL A BARGAIN?
Those addressing guilty plea disclosure often describe the issue as
disclosure in the context “plea bargaining” and “plea bargains.”4 In United States 
v. Ruiz, for example, the only case in which the United States Supreme Court
has addressed guilty plea disclosure, Justice Breyer uses the phrases “plea
bargain” or “plea bargaining” nine times.5 What are the potential consequences
of using the words “bargaining” and “bargain” in framing the guilty plea
disclosure debate? The phrases “plea bargaining” and “plea bargain” are so
ubiquitous in talking and thinking about negotiated resolution of criminal cases
through entry of guilty pleas that their potential significance may fail to register
with those who study and work in our criminal justice system.
The phrases “plea bargaining” and “plea bargain,” in my view, have an 
unfortunate tendency to mislead by suggesting incorrectly that negotiated guilty 
pleas necessarily entail undue leniency toward defendants. The assumption that 
defendants who plead guilty receive lenient treatment, together with the 
assumption that defendants who plead guilty must be guilty, discussed below, 
prompt one to dismiss concern about our criminal justice system’s use of 
negotiated guilty pleas as the primary mechanism for producing criminal 
convictions and to dismiss concern about guilty plea disclosure in particular. As 
I will explain, the defendant does not necessarily or routinely receive a “bargain” 
in any meaningful sense of the word. To avoid this misleading suggestion of 
necessary and undue leniency, I prefer in both my writing and teaching to use 
the phrase “negotiated guilty plea” rather than the more common phrase “plea 
bargain” to describe a criminal defendant waiving the right to trial and pleading 
guilty after entering into an agreement with the prosecution.  
4 Examples of academic commentary using the terms “plea bargaining” and “plea bargain” in 
addressing guilty plea disclosure include: R. Michael Cassidy, Plea Bargaining, Discovery, and the 
Intractable Problem of Impeachment Disclosures, 66 VAND. L. REV. 1427 (2011); John G. Douglass, 
Can Prosecutors Bluff? Brady v. Maryland and Plea Bargaining, 57 CASE W.R.L. REV. 581 (2007); 
John G. Douglass, Fatal Attraction? The Uneasy Courtship of Brady and Plea Bargaining, 50 Emory 
L.J. 437 (2001); Charlie Gerstein, Plea Bargaining and Prosecutorial Motives, 15 U.N.H.L. REV. 1
(2016); Corinna Barret Lain, Accuracy Where It Matters: Brady v. Maryland in the Plea Bargaining
Context, 80 WASH U.L.Q. 1 (2002); Michael N. Petegorsky, Plea Bargaining in the Dark: The Duty
to Disclose Exculpatory Brady Evidence During Plea Bargaining, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 3599 (2013).
5 See United States v. Ruiz, 536 U.S. 622, 625, 631–633 (2002). 
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The word “bargaining” conveys a process of negotiated exchange.6 So 
understood, it accurately describes the process that produces a typical guilty 
plea. The word “bargain” conveys an agreement that is the product of 
negotiation.7 Again, so understood, it accurately describes the agreement that 
typically accompanies a guilty plea. 
But the words “bargaining” and “bargain” also strongly convey the idea of 
a discount, often a steep discount, having been offered and accepted.8 The 
relevant discount in the guilty plea context typically concerns punishment, so 
the phrase “plea bargain” implies the granting of undue leniency in punishment.9 
Is punishment imposed after entry of a negotiated guilty plea necessarily steeply 
discounted? Is it discounted at all? In other words, do negotiated guilty pleas 
necessarily entail undue leniency? 
How one answers this question depends on how one frames the question, 
on the choice of the point of comparison used to assess leniency. To what should 
post- guilty plea punishment be compared? One possibility is the punishment 
the defendant would have been exposed to or likely to have received if convicted 
after a trial. There is almost certainly less punishment imposed after a negotiated 
guilty plea, though not necessarily significantly less, than the possible or likely 
post-trial punishment. In murder cases in some states, for example, the 
possibility of the death penalty may be eliminated as a result of guilty plea 
negotiations, with a defendant receiving a life sentence after pleading guilty. In 
some cases, the prosecutor may agree to dismiss (or agree not to file) charges 
that would trigger mandatory minimum sentences. A reduction in punishment is 
often granted after a guilty plea based on the acceptance of responsibility the 
guilty plea is viewed as reflecting.10 
6 THE NEW OXFORD AMERICAN DICTIONARY 131 (“bargain (verb) . . . . negotiate the terms and 
conditions of a transaction . . . .”) (2001); WEBSTER’S NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF  THE
ENGLISH LANGUAGE 219 (“bargain . . . To negotiate over the terms of an agreement . . .”) (2d ed. 
2005). 
7 THE NEW OXFORD AMERICAN DICTIONARY 131 (“bargain (noun) . . . an agreement between 
two or more parties as to what each party will do for the other . . . .) (2001); WEBSTER’S NEW
INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 219 (“bargain . . . an agreement between 
parties setting forth what each shall give and receive in a transaction between them. . . .”) (2nd ed. 
2005). 
8 See, e.g., CONCISE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 107 (“bargain . . . a thing bought or offered 
for sale for a lower price than normal.”) (11th ed. 2008). 
9 See, e.g., WEBSTER’S THIRD INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY (“bargain plea n. slang: a plea of 
guilty to one usu. the least of several charges allowed by the prosecution when the prosecution stands 
to gain thereby . . . .”) (3rd ed. 1961). 
10 Federal sentencing guidelines provide for a decrease in the offense level by two to 
three levels if the defendant accepts responsibility by pleading guilty. U.S. SENTENCING
COMM’N, GUIDELINES MANUAL §3E1.1 (2016), available at https://perma.cc/RJ7E-5QSS 
[hereinafter USSG]. The acceptance of responsibility reduction decreases the offense level 
by two levels. Id. at §3E1.1(a). If the offense is level 16 or greater, the defendant may receive 
one additional level reduction “upon motion of the government stating that the defendant 
has assisted authorities in the investigation or prosecution of his how misconduct by timely 
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Instead of assessing leniency by comparing post-guilty plea punishment 
with potential or likely post-trial punishment, one can, more appropriately in my 
view, assess leniency by comparing post-guilty plea punishment with 
punishment proportionate to the purposes of punishment. In other words, are 
punishments imposed after guilty pleas necessarily disproportionately low in 
reference to retribution, deterrence, rehabilitation, and incapacitation? From the 
retributive perspective, for example, do defendants who plead guilty necessarily 
or routinely receive much less punishment than they deserve? In utilitarian 
terms, do defendants who plead guilty necessarily receive less punishment than 
required to incapacitate them or deter them or others? If one uses such 
proportionate punishment as the point of comparison rather than possible or 
likely post-trial punishment, one cannot conclude that a negotiated guilty plea 
necessarily or routinely results in steep discounting in punishment. 
The view that “plea bargaining” necessarily or routinely results in unduly 
lenient sentences when measured by the purposes of punishment is contradicted 
by the current unprecedented levels of imprisonment in the United States in both 
state and Federal prisons. What is now commonly referred to as “mass 
incarceration” is not the product exclusively or primarily of severe post-trial 
sentences. Rather, mass incarceration in recent decades is the product of a 
criminal justice system in which punishment primarily (in over 90% of cases) is 
imposed after a negotiated guilty plea.11 These facts alone—extraordinarily high 
levels of punishment and a system that imposes punishment primarily through 
negotiated guilty pleas—belie any suggestion that defendants who plead guilty 
necessarily or routinely are given a “bargain” in the form of undue leniency in 
return for their guilty pleas. 
My experience as an Assistant United States Attorney and previously as a 
law clerk to a federal trial judge was that federal prosecutors do not as a matter 
of course negotiate unduly lenient punishments as part of guilty plea 
negotiations and that federal trial judges do not as a matter of course impose 
unduly lenient sentences after a guilty plea. Rather, my experience was that 
many defendants who entered negotiated guilty pleas, particularly those with 
prior criminal records, often received sentences of incarceration that, while 
perhaps less than they might have received if they had gone to trial and been 
convicted, were nonetheless severe, entailing substantial prison terms. Those 
that did not receive such sentences after negotiated guilty pleas (for example, 
notifying authorities of his intention to enter a plea of guilty.” Id. at §3E1.1(b). 
11 An analysis of the use of guilty pleas in fourteen jurisdictions throughout the United States 
revealed that "[t]he median ratio of pleas to trials among these 14 jurisdictions is 11 pleas for every 
trial." U.S. DEP'T. OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, SPECIAL REPORT, THE PREVALENCE OF 
GUILTY PLEAS 2 (1984). A study of felonies in nine county court systems in Illinois, Michigan, and 
Pennsylvania found that "[c]ontested trials account for less than 8 percent of all dispositions, whereas 
guilty pleas and diversions together account for more than 81 percent of all dispositions and 93 percent 
of all convictions." PETER F. NARDULLI ET AL., THE TENOR OF JUSTICE 203 (1988). 
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first time offenders and those who had committed minor offenses) typically 
would not have received a harsher sentence if they had been convicted after a 
trial. 
The suggestion implicit in the phrases “plea bargaining” and “plea 
bargain”—that defendants punished after a negotiated guilty plea as a matter of 
course get unduly lenient punishment—is simply inaccurate. In addition to being 
misleading, these phrases and what they suggest also, I fear, have had and 
continue to have a more subtle and pernicious impact. The suggestion of undue 
leniency through “plea bargains” prompts judges, legislators, and the public to 
conclude that those who plead guilty are necessarily “getting off easy” either 
with lenient punishment or perhaps no punishment at all. Such a false insinuation 
of undue leniency, consciously or unconsciously, creates a serious risk that 
legitimate concerns about the treatment and rights of defendants who plead 
guilty will, unwisely, be minimized or dismissed entirely. If they believe that 
defendants who plead guilty are always treated with leniency, then perhaps 
judges, legislators, and others who work in and study our criminal justice system 
conclude that they need not worry much, if at all, about those defendants, the 
process by which they are convicted, or the fairness and accuracy of the guilty 
pleas they enter. Such thinking may help explain the failures of both the Supreme 
Court and Congress to require prosecutorial disclosure prior to entry of a guilty 
plea. 
My claim here is not that discounting, sometimes steep discounting, does 
not at times occur in negotiated guilty pleas. The prosecution may want 
cooperation and perhaps future testimony from a particular defendant against 
others the government is investigating and offer that defendant a steep discount 
and perhaps undue leniency to obtain that cooperation and testimony. County 
prosecutor offices in some states may routinely offer steep discounts and undue 
leniency in negotiated guilty pleas simply because they lack adequate resources 
to investigate, prepare, and try cases.12 
A likely place to expect deep discounting in punishment during guilty plea 
negotiations is in cases in which the prosecution’s case has a serious weakness. 
The prosecutor might learn that a key witness has died or cannot be found. In a 
heroin possession case, the police might accidentally destroy the heroin the 
prosecutor intends to introduce at trial. In a rape case, the prosecution’s main 
witness might have reluctance to testify at trial because she fears the humiliation 
of cross- examination. The prosecutors in such cases have a powerful incentive 
to offer significantly reduced punishment during guilty plea negotiations to 
insure a conviction and eliminate the risk of acquittal the weakness creates if the 
case is tried. Evidence qualifies for Brady disclosure “only if there is a 
reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the 
12 See Adam Gershowitz & Laura Killinger, The State (Never) Rests: How Excessive 
Prosecutorial Caseloads Harm Criminal Defendants, 105 NW. L. REV. 261 (2011); Peter A. Joy 
& Kevin C. McMunigal, Overloaded Prosecutors, 33 CRIM. JUST. 31 (2018). 
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result of the proceeding would have been different.”13 In other words Brady 
material is outcome determinative in that it creates a reasonable probability of a 
not guilty verdict at trial.14 Brady cases, then, are ones in which winning at trial 
is, at the very least, problematic. Some prosecutors may choose to disclose the 
Brady material and try such cases. Some may choose to violate (or perhaps 
not recognize) their constitutional obligation and try such cases without 
disclosing the Brady material. More risk averse prosecutors who fear losing at 
trial or committing a constitutional breach may dismiss such cases. But, as 
discussed in the next section, prosecutors who discover Brady material, if they 
do not dismiss the case in order to avoid the risks of losing at trial and violating 
their Brady obligation, have a powerful incentive to (1) negotiate a guilty plea 
without disclosing and (2) offer a very steep discount in punishment to motivate 
the defendant to plead guilty. 
Although, as described in the previous paragraphs, negotiated guilty pleas 
may and almost certainly do at times reflect steep discounts and undue leniency, 
they do not necessarily or even routinely result in undue leniency. My primary 
point is that, in contrast to what the words “bargain” and “bargaining” suggest, 
many of the negotiated guilty pleas in the United States result in the imposition 
of punishment that is severe by any standard rather than unduly lenient. It is 
important for judges, legislators, academics, and others who work in and study 
our criminal justice system to squarely face this reality and not be misled by 
what the terms “plea bargaining” and “plea bargains” suggest when thinking, 
writing, and debating about negotiated guilty pleas in general and about the need 
for guilty plea disclosure in particular. 
A. Is Accuracy a Genuine Concern?
Some are skeptical about whether requiring disclosure of Brady material in
the context of a negotiated guilty plea would contribute to accuracy. Some are 
cavalier, completely dismissing the possibility of innocent defendants pleading 
guilty.15 
An obvious response to such skepticism is an empirical one, pointing to the 
number of wrongful convictions based on guilty pleas that have been revealed. 
13 United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682 (1985). 
14 Id. 
15 See, e.g., Steven Koppell, An Argument Against Increasing Prosecutors’ Disclosure 
Requirements Beyond Brady, 27 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 643, 651 (2014) (quoting Judge Learned 
Hand’s statement that “[o]ur procedure has always been haunted by the ghost of the innocent man 
convicted. It is an unreal dream”). Learned Hand expressed this view in 1923, almost a century 
ago in United States v. Garsson, 291 F. 646, 649 (S.D.N.Y. 1923). It is difficult to see how any 
reasonably well-informed lawyer or law student in 2014 could adhere to the view that innocent 
people being convicted is “an unreal dream” in the face of the many wrongful convictions that have 
been revealed and continue to be revealed across the country. 
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The Innocence Project website reports that 11% of DNA based exonerations 
were in cases involving inaccurate guilty pleas.16 Data from the National 
Registry of Exonerations at the University of Michigan law school indicates that 
15% of exonerations were in inaccurate guilty plea cases.17 The incentives that 
exert pressure on both the prosecution and defense during plea negotiations in 
Brady cases (i.e. cases in which the prosecution has Brady material) also warrant 
serious concern about the accuracy of guilty pleas in Brady cases if disclosure 
is not required in the guilty plea context. In particular, two powerful incentives 
converge in Brady cases: (1) an incentive to resolve Brady cases through a 
negotiated guilty plea; and (2) an incentive to offer a substantial sentencing 
discount during the course of negotiating such a guilty plea. 
Skepticism about factual accuracy in the negotiated guilty plea context is 
strongly grounded in two intuitively powerful but infrequently examined 
assumptions about criminal defendants. The first is the assumption that criminal 
defendants always have sufficient information to reliably establish all elements 
of the charged offenses. As this view is sometimes expressed, the defendant 
knows better than anyone “whether he did it.” Or, as one author has put it, 
“Remember, a defendant is the only one who knows whether they are guilty or 
not.”18 
The second assumption is that innocent defendants never make false 
admissions when establishing the factual basis of guilty pleas because such 
admissions are at first glance appear to be so strongly against the defendants’ 
penal and social interests. False statements in the guilty plea context initially 
seem  particularly unlikely because they are made in open court after defendants 
typically have received the advice of counsel. They also have been warned that 
their statements will result in a criminal conviction and possibly a prison term, 
often a substantial one. 
While both of these assumptions are often well grounded, they are not 
always, especially in Brady cases. In reference to the first assumption, 
defendants typically do know whether certain elements are fulfilled, such as 
whether the defendant engaged in the charged conduct (for example, committed 
the act that caused the victim’s death) and whether the defendant intended a 
particular result (for example, the victim’s death). But, as I have explained at 
length previously, there are a surprising number of cases in which defendants 
are likely not to have adequate knowledge to accurately establish fulfillment of 
an element, especially an element that does not involve the defendant’s conduct 
16 When the Innocent Plead Guilty, INNOCENCE PROJECT (Jan. 26, 2009), 
https://www.innocenceproject.org/when-the-innocent-plead-guilty/ (finding that thirty-one of the 
first 350 DNA exonerations involved persons who pled guilty to crimes they did not commit) 
[https://perma.cc/GNA9-KKJ4]. 
17 Innocents Who Plead Guilty, NATIONAL REGISTRY OF EXONERATIONS (Nov. 24, 2015), 
http://www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/Documents/NRE.Guilty.Plea.Article1.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/B8V8-FGMM]. 
18 Koppell, supra note 15, at 650. 
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or internal mental state.19 In evidence terminology, criminal defendants at times 
lack the personal knowledge concerning some offense elements typically 
required of a witness.20 
In reference to the second assumption, criminal defendants are unlikely in 
many, perhaps most, cases to make false statements against interest under oath 
in open court after being counseled by a lawyer. But the likelihood of a false 
statement increases in direct proportion to the magnitude of the sentencing 
differential the prosecutor offers. False admissions of guilt become self-serving 
if they achieve what the defendant views as a significant enough reduction in 
potential punishment. Accurately described, such statements are simultaneously 
self-serving and against interest. As the sentencing differential increases, the 
magnitude of the self-serving motivation may come to outweigh the fact that the 
admission of guilt is against the defendant’s interest. For example, the incentive 
to falsely admit a crime can be very powerful if by doing so one is assured of a 
life sentence rather than the death penalty. The same would be true if the 
defendant is assured a 10-year sentence rather than a 20-year sentence or, say, a 
sentence of time served rather than a sentence of 5 years in prison. 
To get a sense of the incentives likely to drive resolution of a Brady case, 
consider three possible avenues a prosecutor may pursue to resolve a Brady case: 
(1) dismissal; (2) trial; or (3) negotiated guilty plea. Which avenue or avenues is
the prosecutor likely to pursue?
The most likely resolution for several reasons is dismissal. The prosecutor 
may conclude that dismissal is simply the right thing to do because the Brady 
material (for example, a DNA test eliminating the defendant as the assailant in 
a rape case) convinces the prosecutor the defendant is innocent. If the Brady 
material does not completely exonerate the defendant, it may nonetheless 
convince the prosecutor that dismissal is proper because the prosecutor no longer 
has probable cause to support the charge. Self-interest adds to the prosecutor’s 
motivation to dismiss. Concern about reputation and future promotion creates 
an incentive to dismiss in order to avoid a public loss at trial once the Brady 
material is disclosed. Concern about reputation and judicial and ethical sanctions 
also gives the prosecutor a motive to choose dismissal rather than try the case 
without disclosing the Brady material. 
What if the prosecutor chooses not to dismiss? There may be public 
pressure not to dismiss in a high-profile case. The psychological phenomena of 
tunnel vision and confirmation bias may also make the prosecutor reluctant to 
dismiss.21 If the Brady material does not completely exonerate the defendant, 
19 Kevin C. McMunigal, Disclosure and Accuracy in the Guilty Plea Process, 40 HASTINGS
L.J. 957, 970–82 (1989).
20 See FED. R. EVID. 602. 
21 See, e.g., Alafair S. Burke, Improving Prosecutorial Decision Making: Some Lessons of 
Cognitive Science, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1587, 1593 (2006) (arguing that confirmation bias, 
selective information processing, belief perseverance, and avoidance of cognitive dissonance 
impede prosecutor decision making); Keith A. Findley & Michael S. Scott, The Multiple 
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the prosecutor and police may retain a psychological commitment to a 
previously established view that the defendant is guilty. Or the prosecutor may 
be reluctant to dismiss out of fear that the defendant may be guilty.    
If she does not dismiss, is the prosecutor likely to try a Brady case? It is 
conceivable that, if the Brady material does not completely exonerate the 
defendant, some prosecutors who have a low aversion to risk and are not strongly 
motivated by reputational concerns might choose to “roll the dice” and try the 
case. In my view, though, trial is the resolution of a Brady case rational 
prosecutors are least likely to choose for several reasons. 
Trial after disclosure of Brady material is unappealing since the disclosure 
either assures or greatly increases the probability of an acquittal. As discussed 
above, concern about reputation and promotion create strong incentives for 
prosecutors to avoid trying weak cases. Also, if the prosecutor’s office has a 
heavy caseload, as many do, the prosecutor and the prosecutor’s supervisors may 
decide that such a high-risk case is not worth the expenditure of the office’s 
limited trial resources. Trying the case without disclosing the Brady material is 
also unappealing since, although non-disclosure would increase the chances of 
a conviction, such failure to disclose is a violation of both constitutional and 
ethical obligations. 
How about the third option for resolution of a Brady case—a negotiated 
guilty plea? In my view, especially under a regime in which Brady material does 
not need to be disclosed, a guilty plea is a much more likely avenue for 
prosecutors to choose than trial. In other words, most Brady cases that are not 
dismissed are likely to be resolved through negotiated guilty pleas. 
A negotiated guilty plea is a much more likely resolution of a Brady case 
than a trial for several reasons. Guilty pleas are cheaper than trials, so 
overburdened prosecutors with scarce resources will naturally favor them. The 
negotiated guilty plea is the method of resolution prosecutors use most often and 
therefore are likely to favor due simply to familiarity—it is the path of least 
resistance. Many judges also encourage negotiated guilty pleas to manage their 
calendars. A negotiated guilty plea is less public than a trial, so there is less risk 
of damage to the prosecutor’s reputation from press or public scrutiny. A guilty 
plea eliminates the risk of an acquittal, also reducing the risk of reputational 
damage. The fact that the typical guilty plea entails an admission of guilt may 
entice prosecutors who retain a commitment to an earlier adopted view that the 
defendant is in fact guilty. If the prosecutor is uncertain about guilt, and therefore 
hesitant to dismiss, the defendant’s admission may be psychologically appealing 
and put the prosecutor’s mind at ease. If the prosecutor does choose negotiated 
Dimensions of Tunnel Vision in Criminal Cases, 2006 WIS. L. REV. 291, 292 (analyzing how tunnel 
vision-focusing on a particular suspect, affects all phases of criminal proceedings); Dianne L. 
Martin, Lessons About Justice from the "Laboratory" of Wrongful Convictions: Tunnel Vision, 
the Construction of Guilt and Informer Evidence, 70 UMKC L. REV. 847, 848 (2002) (exploring 
how tunnel vision leads to constructing guilt based on unreliable informants). 
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resolution of a Brady case by guilty plea, how steep a discount is likely to be 
offered? Due to the Brady doctrine’s strict materiality standard, the risk of 
acquittal at trial is significant if Brady material exists. Accordingly, in such cases 
the prosecutor’s incentive to offer steep discounts is significant, and such steep 
discounts create a powerful incentive for the defendant to falsely admit guilt. 
We see, then, in Brady cases the likely convergence of two strong 
prosecutorial incentives. One is a powerful incentive for a prosecutor, if she does 
not dismiss, to seek resolution by negotiated guilty plea. Second, because the 
outcome at trial is bleak, the prosecutor will have little if any incentive to limit 
the sentencing differential offered to motivate the defendant to plead guilty. 
These two prosecutorial incentives, when combined with a defendant’s incentive 
falsely to plead guilty if the sentencing differential is great enough, should give 
us great concern about the likelihood of inaccurate guilty pleas in Brady cases. 
In my view, current debate about guilty plea disclosure fails to reflect 
adequate concern with accuracy and, more particularly, with how the incentive 
structures of both the prosecution and defense, outlined in the previous 
paragraphs, are likely to generate inaccurate guilty pleas. 
Requiring disclosure would not insure the accuracy of guilty pleas. The 
prosecutor might choose simply to violate that duty. The defendant might be so 
risk averse and offered such a steep discount that he chooses to plead guilty 
regardless of knowing of the Brady material. It should, though, increase the 
accuracy of guilty pleas by encouraging prosecutors to dismiss cases in which 
defendants are innocent and encouraging innocent defendants to resist pleading 
guilty.
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III. SHOULD ETHICS AUTHORITIES CREATE PROSECUTORIAL DISCLOSURE
RULES? 
The defense bar, academics, and judges have long expressed concern about 
prosecutorial failure to disclose Brady material. The fact that failure to disclose 
Brady material has been identified as a factor in a significant number of 
wrongful conviction cases intensified this concern as did the number of high 
profile cases in which Brady violations were disclosed, such as the federal 
prosecution of Senator Ted Stevens.22 In response, ethics authorities have begun 
to make greater use of ethical rules to address prosecutorial disclosure.23 
This move by ethics authorities has itself created controversy about whether 
it is appropriate for ethics authorities to be taking on the task of trying to insure 
and expand prosecutorial disclosure. I have argued previously, as have others, 
that ethics authorities should address prosecutorial disclosure.24 Others have 
taken issue with this view.25 For example, Professor Michael Cassidy argues, on 
grounds of effectiveness and institutional competence grounds, that ethics 
authorities should leave prosecutorial disclosure issues to legislatures and 
courts.26 
A. Institutional Competence
I agree that courts and legislatures are institutionally superior in many ways
to state ethics authorities for taking on the task of figuring out what prosecutors 
should and should not be required to do. Courts have greater expertise and 
experience than ethics authorities in dealing with criminal discovery, though I 
very much doubt the same is true for many legislators. One might prefer 
legislative resolution of criminal procedural issues involving prosecutors for the 
same reasons we treat legislatures as supreme in the field of substantive criminal 
law. Legislatures are typically viewed as the most democratically representative 
branch of government. At least in theory, what they choose to enact is more 
likely to be and to be viewed by the public as democratically legitimate. When 
it comes to dealing with the most severe sanctions a government can impose on 
22 See Gershman, supra note 2, at 162. 
23 See, e.g., ABA Formal Op. 09-454. 
24 See Kevin C. McMunigal, Disclosure and Accuracy in the Guilty Plea Process, 40 HASTINGS 
L.J. 957, 1025–26 (1989); Peter A. Joy & Kevin C. McMunigal, ABA Explains Prosecutors'
Ethical Disclosure Duty, 24 CRIM. JUST. 41, 44 (2010); Ellen Yaroshevsky, Ethics and Plea 
Bargaining—What's Discovery Got to Do With It?, 23 CRIM. JUST. 28, 28 (2008). 
25 See Cassidy, supra note 3; Kristin M. Schimpff, Rule 3.8, The Jencks Act, and How the ABA 
Created a Conflict Between Ethics and the Law on Prosecutorial Disclosure, 61 AM. L. REV. 1729 
(2012). 
26 See, Cassidy, supra note 3, at 1460–66. 
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its citizens, such as imprisonment and even death, both the fact and appearance 
of democratic legitimacy are particularly salient. 
In contrast, most of those involved in the creation of legal ethics rules, such 
as state bar association officials and many ethics authorities, are neither 
democratically elected nor representative. State supreme court justices, though, 
have final say in the approval of a state’s legal ethics rules and they do stand for 
election in many states. State bar associations are likely to be and to be viewed 
by the public as "captured" by the legal profession and thus likely to act in the 
interests of lawyers rather than the public interest. The influence of the defense 
bar within some state bar associations may be viewed as likely to distort the 
work of state ethics authorities to unfairly favor criminal defendants. 
These points, though valid, are greatly undercut in my view by the reality 
of how courts and legislatures have actually acted (or, more precisely, how they 
have failed to act) in relation to prosecutorial disclosure in the context of 
negotiated guilty pleas. More than 50 years have passed since Brady was 
decided. Yet the United States Supreme Court has failed to tell federal and state 
prosecutors whether they are constitutionally required to disclose core 
exculpatory Brady material to a defendant who pleads guilty.27 Nor has Congress 
required any disclosure prior to entry of a guilty plea—even of highly 
exculpatory evidence—by amending Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 16 
dealing with discovery or Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11 dealing with 
guilty pleas. In a criminal justice system that relies overwhelmingly on 
negotiated guilty pleas, the fact that the Supreme Court, Congress and many 
state courts and legislatures have left such an important duty in relation to guilty 
pleas unaddressed for so long seriously undermines confidence that they are in 
reality institutionally capable of addressing this issue. 
Practical political realities undercut the institutional competence argument 
in regard to legislatures and may help explain this failure. Legislative action in 
regard to criminal justice issues tends overwhelmingly to move in just one 
direction— toward greater severity of punishment and harsher treatment of 
defendants. In a “post Willy Horton” era of political attack advertising, many 
legislators fear doing anything that decreases severity of punishment or provides 
defendants greater rights for fear of being labeled "soft on crime." For example, 
despite substantial and growing public support in many states, the legalization 
of marijuana, the most significant recent change in our country’s drug laws, has 
not been accomplished by legislators. Rather, voters have to date been required 
to bypass legislators via referenda to achieve marijuana reform. Because the 
federal system lacks such a referendum process, there appears currently to be no 
27 In 2002, almost 40 years after Brady was decided, the Court did finally address one aspect   of 
Brady disclosure in the guilty plea process, holding that a defendant can be required to waive disclosure 
of Brady impeachment material as part of a guilty plea agreement. United States v. Ruiz, 536 U.S. 622 
(2002). 
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chance of reforming federal marijuana laws. While a state bar may be captured 
by the criminal defense bar, legislatures, due to the same “soft on crime” fear 
discussed in the previous paragraph, appear to be captured by the prosecutorial 
lobby. 
In sum, institutional competence arguments against ethics authorities fail to 
reflect institutional flaws and political realities. While state bars certainly have 
their institutional weaknesses, so do courts and legislatures. But at least some 
state bars are addressing this important issue. Though, along with Professor 
Cassidy, I would prefer a criminal procedure rule setting forth a realistic and 
practical disclosure rule for the guilty plea setting, since the Supreme Court, 
Congress and many state legislatures have for a very, very long time largely 
abdicated the field of guilty plea disclosure, I think state ethics authorities, with 
their admitted weaknesses, should address prosecutorial disclosure. 
B. Effectiveness
Professor Cassidy argues that enforcement of prosecutorial disclosure
obligations by ethics authorities is likely to be ineffectual.28 While there was for 
many years a complete lack of enforcement of the ethics rule requiring 
prosecutorial disclosure,29 in recent decades ethics authorities in some states 
have disciplined wayward prosecutors. Perhaps the most notable example has 
been the disbarment of Michael Nifong in the wake of his failure to disclose 
exculpatory DNA evidence in the infamous Duke Lacrosse case.30 
Despite these examples of increased enforcement, I agree with Professor 
Cassidy that ethics enforcement is unlikely to be terribly effective in terms of 
deterring prosecutorial wrongdoing. But that prediction does not lead me to 
conclude that ethics authorities should not create and enforce prosecutorial 
disclosure obligations. 
First of all, many ethics rules, including such core rules as those dealing 
with confidentiality and conflict of interest, are often not well enforced. Lack of 
reporting by lawyers, judges and even clients is one reason for this. Lack of 
investigative and enforcement resources at both the local and state levels is 
another. If weak enforcement or enforceability were reason enough to bar 
creation of an ethics rules, we would have a much slimmer set of ethics rules 
than we do now. 
Second, in addressing the enforceability of ethics disclosure rules we need 
28 See Cassidy, supra note 3, at 1462. 
29 See Richard A. Rosen, Disciplinary Sanctions Against Prosecutors for Brady Violations: A 
Paper Tiger, 65 N.C.L. REV. 693 (1987). 
30 See Robert P. Mosteller, Exculpatory Evidence, Ethics, and the Road to the Disbarment of 
Mike Nifong: The Critical Importance of Full Open-File Discovery, 15 GEO. MASON L. REV. 257 
(2008), for a detailed discussion of the Nifong disbarment and the events leading up to it. 
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to avoid running afoul of the Nirvana fallacy.31 If one frames the issue, as 
Professor Cassidy appears to suggest, as a choice between imperfect 
enforcement of an ethics disclosure rule and robust enforcement of either the 
constitutional obligation or a proposed legislatively created disclosure rule, the 
obvious choice is robust enforcement of the constitutional or legislative rule. But 
that is not the choice we face. In the view of many, enforcement of the current 
constitutional obligation is itself anemic. And there is little reason to conclude 
that a legislative rule, even if created, would be robustly enforced. 
If we view both enforcement of the constitutional obligation and the ethical 
obligation as being weak, is there a valid reason to choose one over the other? 
Should we even choose at all? It seems to me that we should assess the 
usefulness of an ethics disclosure rule by asking if it is likely to add at all to the 
deterrence of bad prosecutorial behavior and accept it if we conclude that it is 
likely to add, even marginally, to deterrence. In short, the fact that ethics 
enforcement might provide even a marginal increase in disclosure should be 
seen as a positive. 
C. Impact on Legal Reform
Is activity regarding prosecutorial disclosure by state ethics authorities
likely to discourage reform by courts and legislators? Or to encourage such 
reform? One possibility is that judges and legislators might conclude that there 
is no need for them to act to create new disclosure rules or enforce existing ones 
because ethics authorities are already addressing the issue. Judges and legislators 
may come to see prosecutorial disclosure as primarily an ethical issue, like 
solicitation, confidentiality, and conflict of interest. A lawyer working in ethics 
enforcement once told me that he felt that the low level of judicial enforcement 
of the Brady obligation and the low level of enforcement of the ethical disclosure 
obligation was the result of judges and ethics authorities each seeing 
enforcement of prosecutorial disclosure as being the primary responsibility of 
the other and thus failing to act. 
In my view a more plausible possibility is that ethics authorities addressing 
prosecutorial disclosure will encourage courts and legislators to act by focusing 
attention on prosecutorial disclosure issues and reinforcing the view that certain 
types of disclosure are essential to the prosecutor’s role in our criminal justice 
system. 
D. Informational Distortion
Another reason ethics authorities should take an interest in prosecutorial
disclosure in the guilty plea context is because prosecutorial non-disclosure of 
31 See H. Demsetz, Information and Efficiency: Another Viewpoint, 12 J. L. & ECON. 1, 2 (1969). 
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Brady material in the guilty plea context raises serious issues of candor—of 
prosecutors effectively misleading the defense. Prosecutors have a strong 
incentive to disclose inculpatory evidence early in such a case to encourage 
acceptance of a guilty plea offer and, for the same reason, not to disclose 
evidence that weakens a case, such as Brady material. Unless disclosure is 
compelled in the guilty plea context, these incentives will inevitably lead some 
prosecutors to provide to the defense in Brady cases a very distorted view of 
information about the case that, though it does not involve the making of a false 
statement, is nonetheless highly misleading in a way that is inappropriate for a 
public prosecutor. 
1. Inculpatory Evidence
In addition to exculpatory evidence, prosecutorial disclosure obligations 
also deal with inculpatory evidence, the items of evidence the prosecutor will 
introduce into evidence if the case goes to trial. The key concern with disclosure 
of inculpatory evidence typically is not compelling disclosure. The prosecutor’s 
interest in winning the case assures that inculpatory evidence will be disclosed 
through admission at trial. The primary concern with inculpatory evidence is the 
timing of disclosure rather than complete failure to disclose. Without a discovery 
rule to the contrary, a prosecutor in anticipation of trial might seek strategic 
advantage by delaying disclosure of inculpatory evidence until just before or 
even during trial in order to surprise the defense, undermine the defense’s ability 
to challenge or otherwise respond to the inculpatory evidence, or lure the defense 
into committing to a strategic position that the undisclosed inculpatory evidence 
makes untenable. Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 16 focuses on inculpatory 
evidence and addresses the timing of disclosure in order to prevent prosecutors 
from obtaining such a strategic advantage.32 
The fact that our criminal justice system relies on negotiated guilty pleas as 
the primary procedural vehicle for resolving criminal cases creates a natural 
counter- incentive that checks the incentive for a prosecutor to delay disclosure 
of inculpatory evidence to gain advantage at trial, as described above. The goal 
of convincing the defendant to accept and defense counsel to recommend a 
negotiated guilty plea gives the prosecutor an incentive to disclose inculpatory 
evidence early, well before trial. In a criminal justice system in which 
prosecutors often have heavy caseloads and insufficient resources, it is important 
for a prosecutor to know as early as possible which cases will and which cases 
will not go to trial in order to maximize the prosecutor’s ability to allocate scarce 
trial preparation time and resources to the cases most likely to be tried. 
32 FED. R. CRIM. P. 16. 
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2. Exculpatory Evidence
While prosecutors who operate in what is primarily a negotiated resolution 
system and are faced with a large number of cases are likely to be generous with 
telling defendants the “bad news” (i.e. the inculpatory evidence), the opposite is 
true in regard to exculpatory evidence. Just as exculpatory evidence reduces the 
prosecutor’s chances of success at trial, awareness of that evidence by the 
defendant and defense counsel during guilty plea negotiations reduces the 
chances that the defense will accept a guilty plea offer. 
What then is the potential impact of these two incentives operating 
together— the incentive to be generous in disclosing inculpatory evidence and 
the incentive not to disclose exculpatory evidence? In other words, what is the 
impact of a prosecutor being generous with inculpatory evidence while failing 
to disclose exculpatory evidence? In many cases, there is substantial inculpatory 
evidence and little, if any, evidence that weakens the prosecution’s case. In such 
cases, the interaction of these incentives will have no significance. But in a case 
in which there exists both inculpatory evidence and exculpatory evidence that 
meets the Brady doctrine’s restrictive materiality test, the prosecutor by not 
disclosing the Brady material creates for the defense a highly distorted view of 
the evidence in the case that borders on, if it does not in fact constitute, 
misrepresentation. The prosecutor will not have made a false statement. But the 
prosecutor will have created a situation in which the defense will be misled by 
being encouraged to draw a false inference about the state of the evidence in the 
case. 
A good reason for ethics rules to require Brady disclosure in the guilty plea 
context is to avoid pressuring or allowing prosecutors to so mislead some 
defendants. 
IV. CONCLUSION
Looking back over the academic literature, court opinions, and ethics 
opinions and rules of recent decades in regard to prosecutorial disclosure, I 
confess to mixed feelings. The good news is that the topic of prosecutorial 
disclosure has received a great deal of attention and continues to do so, as 
evidenced by Professor Gershman’s recent book. Additional good news is that 
more jurisdictions are moving to open file discovery, which, in my view, is the 
only truly effective way to deal with prosecutorial disclosure. The discouraging 
news is that all that attention—including many well documented and publicized 
disclosure failures—has failed to register sufficiently with the Supreme Court, 
Congress, the Department of Justice, many state legislatures, and some 
prosecutors, both federal and state, across the country.
